We study the design of mechanisms in combinatorial auction domains. We focus on settings where the auction is repeated, motivated by auctions for licenses or advertising space. We consider models of agent behaviour in which they either apply common learning techniques to minimize the regret of their bidding strategies, or apply short-sighted best-response strategies. We ask: when can a black-box approximation algorithm for the base auction problem be converted into a mechanism that approximately preserves the original algorithm's approximation factor on average over many iterations? We present a general reduction for a broad class of algorithms when agents minimize external regret. We also present a new mechanism for the combinatorial auction problem that attains an O( √ m) approximation on average when agents apply best-response dynamics.
Introduction
We consider problems in the combinatorial auction (CA) domain, where m objects are to be allocated among n potential buyers in order to maximize total value, subject to problem-specific feasibility constraints. These packing problems are complicated by game-theoretic issues: the buyers might benefit from misrepresenting their values to an allocation algorithm. This prompts us to design mechanisms that use payments to encourage reasonable behaviour. The well-known VCG mechanism solves incentive issues by inducing truthtelling as a dominant strategy, but is infeasible for computationally intractible problems. Indeed, for many interesting problems (such as combinatorial auctions), there are large gaps between the bestknown approximation factors attainable by efficient truthful mechanisms and those possible in purely computational settings. For some problems, these large gaps are essential [25] .
In this paper we consider the problem of designing mechanisms that implement approximations to combinatorial auction problems without the use of dominant-strategy truthfulness. We are motivated by the domain of repeated auctions, where an auction problem is resolved multiple times with the same objects and bidders. These include, for example, auctions for advertising spaces or slots [13] , bandwidth auctions (such as the FCC spectrum auction), airline landing rights auctions [10] , etc. In these settings a mechanism for the (oneshot) auction problem corresponds to a repeated game to be played by the agents. 1 The question of how to model agent behaviour in repeated games has been studied extensively in the economic and algorithmic game theory literature (see chapters 17-21 of [24] and references therein). Many proposed models suppose that agents choose strategies (or distributions thereover) at equilibrium, where no agent has incentive to unilaterally deviate. There are, however, a number of reasons to believe such models are unrealistic: in general equilibria are computationally hard to find, and may not exist without the presence of agents who randomize over strategies for no reason other than to preserve the stability of the system. Even when pure equilibria exist, agents may not necessarily converge to an equilibrium (of the single-round game) or agree on which equilibrium (of the extended-form game) to choose. Such concerns have also been noted elsewhere [4, 14] .
We will instead focus our attention on two models of agent behaviour that do not make equilibrium assumptions, and have gained recent interest in the algorithmic game theory literature. In the first model, agents can play arbitrary sequences of strategies for the repeated auction, under the assumption that they obtain low regret relative to the best fixed strategy in hindsight. More precisely, the average external regret of such a bidder must tend to 0 as the number of auction rounds increases. These regret-minimizing bidders can be seen as agents that learn how to bid intelligently (relative to any fixed strategy benchmark) from the bidding history of past auction iterations. Note that we require no assumptions about the synchrony or asynchrony of updates; arbitrary sets of agents can update their strategies concurrently. The regretminimization assumption is realistic because simple, efficient algorithms exist that minimize external regret for linear optimization problems such as repeated auctions [19, 20] . Under this model, our goal is to design an auction mechanism that achieves an approximation to the optimal social welfare on average over sufficiently many rounds of the repeated auction. This is precisely the problem of designing a mechanism with bounded price of total anarchy, as introduced by Blum et al [4] .
In the second model, we assume that agents choose myopic best-response strategies to the current strategies of the other agents. Such bidding behaviour is best motivated in settings where agents update their declarations asynchronously (ie. not concurrently). We therefore model this behaviour as follows: on each auction round, an agent is chosen uniformly at random, and that agent is given the opportunity to change his strategy to the current myopic best-response. Under this model, our goal again is to design auction mechanisms that achieve approximations to the best possible social welfare on average over sufficiently many auction rounds, with high probability over the random choices of bidders. This is closely related to the concept of the price of (myopic) sinking, as introduced by Goemans et al [14] .
Our high-level goal is to decouple computational issues from incentives issues. A full (and admittedly ambitious) solution in our domain would be a black-box conversion of a given approximation algorithm into a mechanism that implements 2 the same approximation ratio, on average over sufficiently many auction rounds, given our model of bidder behaviour. Our primary research question, partially addressed herein, is to what extent such implementations are possible.
Our Contribution
We design mechanisms that are based on a particular class of approximation algorithms for combinatorial auction problems: those that are monotone and satisfy the loser-independence property. An algorithm is monotone if, whenever a bidder can win some set S by declaring a value of v for it, then he could also win any subset of S with any declared value at least v. This monotonicity condition characterizes truthfulness when bidders are single-minded (meaning that each agent has value for only a single set), but not for general auction problems [22] . Roughly speaking, an algorithm is loser-independent if the outcome for an agent depends only on those agents who would win if he did not participate, and on their declared values for their winnings. This extends a notion of loser-independence for single-parameter problems, introduced by Chekuri and Gamzu [8] , to general auction problems. Many interesting algorithms satisfy these properties, including greedy algorithms for CAs [22] and convex bundle auctions [1] , primal-dual algorithms for unsplittable flow [7] , and others.
Our first main result is that any monotone loserindependent c-approximate algorithm can be implemented as a mechanism with price of total anarchy at most c(1 + o(1)). Our mechanism is a black-box reduction from an algorithm for a oneshot auction iteration, and the same mechanism is applied each auction round. The form of our mechanism is very simple: on each round, it applies a simple modification to the bidders' declarations, then runs the approximation algorithm on the modified declarations and charges critical prices (i.e. an agent who wins a set pays the smallest amount he could have declared for that set and won it, given the declarations of the other bidders).
Our implementation does not depend on the specific algorithms used by the agents to minimize their regret; only that their regret vanishes as the number of rounds increases. The rate of convergence to our approximation bound will depend on the rate at which the agents' regret vanishes.
We demonstrate that our mechanism is resilient to the presence of byzantine agents, in the following sense. If each agent either applies regretminimizing strategies or makes arbitrary declarations (but never declares more than his true value for a set), then the mechanism attains a c(1 + o(1)) approximation to the optimal welfare obtainable by the regret-minimizing bidders. The nooverbidding assumption is necessary (as otherwise a byzantine agent could bid arbitrarily highly and prevent any welfare from being obtained) and realistic, since we can view byzantine players as not understanding how to participate intelligently in the auction and thus likely to bid conservatively.
We conjecture that the mechanism described above also implements an O(c) approximation, on average over sufficiently many rounds, in the model of best-response bidders. Whether this is so is an important open question.
We then focus specifically on the general combinatorial auction problem in the best-response model. Specifically, we present a mechanism that implements an O(s) approximation for combinatorial auctions with set allocations of size at most s, then extend this to a mechanism that implements an O( √ m) approximation for general combinatorial auctions. Note that this approximation factor is the best possible, in that we attain it with high probability after polynomially many auction rounds (in fact, only a slightly superlinear number of rounds). We point out that while truthful mechanisms with similar approximation ratios are known for single-minded combinatorial auctions, our results are significant improvements over what is known to be achieveable with deterministic truthful algorithms. Our results require a mild game-theoretic assumption, which is that bidders will not apply strategies that are (strictly) dominated by easilyfound alternatives. This is precisely the assumption of algorithmically undominated strategies, as introduced by Babaioff et al [2] . Additionally, the mechanism for best-response bidders also applies a technique known in implementation theory as virtual implementation, where an alternative social choice rule is applied with vanishingly small probability [18] . We view this not as an introduction of randomness into the algorithm being implemented, but rather as the introduction of a trembling-hand consideration into the solution concept that encourages reasonable behaviour when best-response agents must distinguish between otherwise equally beneficial strategies.
Regret Minimization
We now describe the concept of external regret minimization in further detail. The external regret of a sequence of declarations is the difference between the average utility of an agent (i.e. value of goods received minus payment extracted) and the maximum average utility that could have been obtained by a single fixed declaration made each round. An algorithm for generating declarations is regret-minimizing if its regret vanishes as a function of the number of auction rounds.
A simple and efficient algorithm due to Kalai and Vempala [20] minimizes regret for linear optimization problems, even when the strategy space has exponential size. The algorithm requires access to an exact best-response oracle. Kakade et al [19] show how to use a γ-approximate best response oracle to achieve a γ-approximation to the best fixed declaration in hindsight.
The regret-minimization mechanism we construct in this paper will reduce the strategic choices of bidders to a simple linear optimization problem, so that the algorithms described above can be used by agents to minimize external regret. This requires access to best-response oracles for the approximation algorithms being implemented. The ability to compute best-response choices is also a necessary component for the setting of bestresponse bidders, where the best-response assumption certainly requires that such strategies can be found efficiently. It is easy to compute bestresponses when agents choose between only polynomially many strategies (such as, for example, when each agent's true valuation is a combination of polynomially many desired bundles). In general, however, the problem of computing bestresponse is non-trivial when agents have exponentially many strategic choices; we leave the construction of such oracles to the creators of particu-lar auction mechanisms.
Related Work
Truthful mechanisms for the combinatorial auction problem have been extensively studied. For general CAs, Hastad's well-known inapproximability result [16] shows that it is hard to approximate the problem to within Ω( √ m) assuming N P = ZP P . The best known deterministic truthful mechanism for CAs with general valuations attains an approximation ratio of O(
anism that is truthful in expectation was given by Lavi and Swamy [21] . Dobzinski, Nisan and Schapira [12] then gave an O( √ m)-approximate universally truthful randomized mechanism. Many variations on the combinatorial auction problem have been considered in the literature. Bartal et. al. [3] give a truthful O(m 1 B−2 ) mechanism for multi-unit combinatorial auctions with B copies of each object, for all B ≥ 3. Dobzinski and Nisan [11] construct a truthful 2-approximate mechanism for multi-unit auctions. Many other problems have truthful mechansisms ( [7, 22, 23] ) when bidders are restricted to being single-minded. In [5] the authors study the limited power of certain classes of greedy algorithms for truthfully approximating CA problems.
The problem of designing combinatorial auction mechanisms that implement approximations at equilibria (and, in particular, Bayes-Nash equilibria for partial information settings) was considered in [9] for submodular CAs, and in [6] for general CA problems. Implementation at equilibrium, especially for the alternative goal of profit maximization, has a rich history in the economics literature; see, for example, Jackson [18] for a survey.
The study of regret-minimization goes back to the work of Hannan on repeated two-player games [15] . Kalai and Vempala [20] extend the work of Hannan to online optimization problems, and Kakade et al [19] further extend to settings of approximate regret minimization. Blum et al [4] apply regret-minimization to the study of inefficiency in repeated games, coining the phrase "price of total anarchy" for the worst-case ratio between the optimal objective value and the average objective value when agents minimize regret.
Properties of best-response dynamics in repeated games, and especially the question of convergence to a pure equilibrium, is well-studied (see Chapter 19 of [24] ). The study of average performance of best-response dynamics as a metric of game inefficiency, the so-called "price of sinking," was introduced by Goemanns et al [14] . Babaioff et al [2] study implementation of algorithms in undominated strategies, which is a relaxation of the dominant strategy truthfulness concept. They focus on a variant of the CA problem in which agents are assumed to have "single-value" valuations, and present a mechanism to implement such auctions in a multi-round fashion. By comparison, mechanisms in our proposed model solve each instance of an auction in a one-shot manner, and our solution concept assumes that the auction is repeated multiple times.
Model and Definitions
In general we will use boldface to represent vectors, subscript i to denote the ith component, and subscript −i to denote all components except i, so that, for example,
We consider the domain of combinatorial auction problems, where n agents desires subsets of a set M of m objects. An allocation profile is a collection of subsets X 1 , . . . , X n , where X i is thought of as the subset allocated to agent i. A particular problem instance is defined by the set of feasible allocation profiles that are permitted; for example, the general combinatorial auction problem requires that all allocated subsets be disjoint. Each agent i has a privately-held valuation function t i : 2 M → R, his type, that assigns a value to each allocation. We assume that valuation functions are monotone and normalized so that v(∅) = 0. A valuation function v is single-minded if there exists S ⊆ M and x ≥ 0 such that v(T ) = x if S ⊆ T and v(T ) = 0 otherwise. We will write ∅ for the zero valuation, and (S, x) for a singleminded declaration for S at value x.
An allocation rule A assigns to each valuation profile v a feasible outcome A(v); we write A i (v) for the allocation to agent i. We write A for both an allocation rule and an algorithm that implements it.
An allocation rule is loser-independent if, whenever
. In other words, agent i's perception of the behaviour of A depends only on those agents who would win if agent i did not participate, and on their declared values for their winnings.
A payment rule P assigns a vector of n payments to each valuation profile. A direct revelation mechanism M is composed of an allocation rule A and a payment rule P . The mechanism proceeds by eliciting a valuation profile d of declarations from the agents, then applying the allocation and payment rules to d. The utility of agent i for mechanism M, given declaration profile d,
We think of each agent as wanting to choose
The social welfare obtained by allocation profile X, given type profile t, is SW (X, t) = i t i (X i ). Given fixed type profile t, we write SW opt for max X {SW (X, t)}, and
for the average welfare obtained over all declarations in D. We will sometimes replace subscript A by M, in which case the social welfare is for the allocation rule of
Given allocation rule A, agent i, declaration profile d −i , and set S, the critical price θ A i (S, d −i ) for S is the minimum value that agent i could bid on set S and be allocated S by A given fixed
We say that a declaration d i is weakly dominated
That is, the utility of agent i approaches the utility of the optimal fixed strategy in hindsight. 
Procedure SIMPLIFY: given the declarations of the other bidders. That is, d
Regret-Minimizing Bidders
In this section we prove that if agents avoid algorithmically dominated strategies and minimize external regret, then a loser-independent monotone algorithm A can be converted into a mechanism with almost no loss to its average approximation ratio over many rounds. The mechanism, M A , is described in Figure 1 . Mechanism M A proceeds by first simplifying the declaration given by each agent, then passing the simplified declarations to algorithm A. The resulting allocation is paired with a payment scheme that charges critical prices.
The simplification process SIMPLIFY essentially converts any declaration into a single-minded declaration (and does not affect declarations that are already single-minded). We will therefore assume without loss of generality that agents make single-minded declarations, as additional information is not used by the mechanism.
profile; we suppose each d i is a single-minded bid for set S i . We draw the following conclusion about the bidding choices of rational agents.
Lemma 3.1. Declaration d i is an undominated strategy for agent i if and only if
On the other hand, if
For simplicity we will assume such a d −i exists; handling the general case requires only a technical and uninteresting extension of notation 4 . Thus declaration
One implication of Lemma 3.1 is that the strategic choice of an agent participating in mechanism M A reduces to a linear optimization problem. On each round, we can think of agent i as choosing set S i , which is the set he will attempt to win that round. Once S i is chosen, an undominated declaration for agent i is determined: the single-minded declaration for S i at value t i (S i ). Given that agent i chooses set S i , his utility will be t i (S i ) − w i , where
} is the price for set S i , determined by the declarations of the other agents, capped at t i (S i ). Thus, since utilities are linear in the choice of S i , agents can indeed apply the regret-minimization algorithm of Kalai and Vempala [20] to choose strategies that minimize external regret.
We now proceed with bounding the social welfare obtained by M A . Let A 1 , . . . , A n be an optimal assignment for types t.
T is a sequence of declarations to our mechanism. The definition of regret minimization then immediately implies the following. 4 If
′ are equivalent strategies. We can therefore think of d i as being "the same" as a single-minded declaration for S i at value t i (S i ). We will ignore this technical issue for the remainder of the paper, in the interest of keeping the exposition simple.
Lemma 3.2. If agent i minimizes his external regret in bid sequence D, then
Assume now that algorithm A is loser independent. We can then relate the value of the solution returned by an algorithm to the critical prices of the sets in an optimal solution.
Proof
The loser independence property implies that we can perform this operation independently for each agent (i.e.
without affecting critical prices), and moreover
We are now ready to proceed with the proof of our main result in this section. 
T be a sequence of declarations in which all agents minimize external regret. By Lemma 3.2,
Summing over all i, we have o(1) ). By Lemma 3.3, this implies
) for all i and t by Lemma 3.1, so we conclude (c + 1) o(1) ). Since the term hidden by the asymptotic notation vanishes with T and does not depend on n, we obtain the desired result. 1) ) implementation of the unsplittable flow problem with minimum edge capacity B [7] , and an O(R 4/3 ) implementation of the combinatorial auction of convex bundles in the plane where R is the maximum aspect ratio over all desired bundles [1] .
We note that, since agents experience no regret at a pure Nash equilibrium, an immediate corollary to Theorem 3.4 is that any monotone loserindependent c-approximate algorithm can be implemented as a mechanism with c + 1 price of anarchy. We remark that an alternative proof of this result has been given recently using a different mechanism construction [6] . Also, the rate at which the welfare obtained by M A converges to an average that is a c + 1 approximation to optimal depends on the rate of convergence of players' external regret to 0. The average welfare obtained after T rounds will have an additive loss of (n)(r(T )), where r(T ) is the average regret experienced by an agent after T rounds. Assuming that agents apply algorithms that minimize regret at a rate of r(T ) = o(1/ √ T ), which is easily attainable using the algorithm of Kalai and Vempala [20] , the additive error term is at most a constant when T is at least quadratic in n.
Resilience to Byzantine Agents
Suppose that in addition to regret-minimizing agents, the auction participants include byzantine agents. The only restriction we impose on the behaviour of such agents is that they do not overbid on any set; that is d i (S) ≤ t i (S) for any S and byzantine agent i. We can motivate this restriction either through our characterization of undominated strategies in Lemma 3.1, or by thinking of byzantine players as not understanding how to participate rationally in the auction, and hence likely to be conservative in the way that they participate. Under this assumption, since Lemma 3.3 holds for any declaration profile, we easily obtain the following generalization to Theorem 3.4. 
Importance of Loser-Independence
We note that the loser independence property is necessary for Theorem 3.4, as the following example demonstrates.
Example 3.6. Consider an auction problem in which no agent can be allocated more than s objects, and moreoever M = A ∪ B where |A| = |B| = m/2 and the mechanism must either allocate objects in A or objects in B, but not both. Consider the algorithm that takes the maximum over two solutions: a greedy assignment of subsets of A, and a greedy assignment of subsets of B. This algorithm obtains an s + 1 approximation.
Consider now an instance of the problem in which a single agent desires all of B with value 1, and each of m/2 agents desires a separate singleton in A with value 1 − ǫ. Suppose that the agent desiring B declares his valuation truthfully, but the other agents declare the zero valuation. On this input, the algorithm under consideration obtains only an m/2 approximation to the optimal solution. However, this set of declarations forms a Nash equilibrium, and hence each agent has zero regret under this input profile. Thus, even if agents minimize their regret, our mechanism may obtain a very poor approximation to the optimal social welfare over arbitrarily many auction rounds.
Best-Response Agents
In this section we consider the problem of designing mechanisms for agents that apply myopic best-response strategies asynchronously. Recall that in our model agents are chosen for update uniformly at random, one per round. In order to keep our exposition clear, we will make two additional assumptions about the nature of the best-response behaviour (which can be removed, as we discuss below). First, we will suppose that in the initial state every bidder makes the empty declaration ∅. Second, we suppose that if a bidder is chosen for update but cannot improve his utility, he will choose to maintain his previous strategy. These assumptions will simplify the process of characterizing best-response strategies of agents, and in particular the statement of Lemma 4.3 in the next section. It is possible to remove these assumptions, at the cost of a minor modification to the mechanisms we propose. We defer a more complete discussion to the appendix.
A simple example shows that mechanism M A may not converge to a Nash equilibrium via bestresponse dynamics; this example is presented in the appendix. We conjecture that, on average, the best-response dynamics on mechanism M A obtains a good approximation to the optimal social welfare.
Conjecture 4.1. If A is a monotone loserindependent c-approximate algorithm, then M A has O(c) price of (myopic) sinking.
As partial progress toward resolving Conjecture 4.1, we construct alternative mechanisms that are more amenable to best-response analysis. These mechanisms are tailored specifically to the general combinatorial auction problem, and combinatorial auctions with cardinality-restricted sets. Our hope is to demonstrate the intuition behind Conjecture 4.1 and explore mechanism design tools that may prove useful in its resolution.
The primary tool we will use is the following probabilistic lemma, which pertains to any mechanism in a best-response setting. Suppose M is a mechanism, and D is a sequence of best-response declarations for M. For any d, let P 1 (d) = P 1 (d −i ) be some property of d that does not depend on d i , and let P 2 (d) = P 2 (d i ) be some property depending only on d i . can be compared to a random walk on {0, 1}, where at each step the current state changes with probability 1/n. The number of occurrances of B t i is dominated by the number of occurrances of 0 in such a random walk. A straightforward application of the method of bounded average differences shows that this value is concentrated around its expectation, which is at most 
Lemma 4.2. Suppose that, for any
d, if P 1 (d −i ) is
A Mechanism for s-CAs
Consider the s-CA problem, which is a combinatorial auction in which no agent can be allocated more than s objects. An algorithm that greedily assigns sets in descending order by value obtains an (s + 1) approximation. 5 Call this algorithm A sCA . We will construct a mechanism M sCA based on A sCA ; it is described in Figure 2 . This algorithm simplifies incoming bids (in the same way as M A ) and runs algorithm A sCA to find a potential allocation. However, an additional condition for inclusion in the solution is imposed: the value declared for a set must be larger than the sum of all bids for intersecting sets. Potential allocations that satisfy this condition are allocated, and the mechanism charges critical prices (that is, the smallest value at which an agent would be allocated their set by M sCA , which is not necessarily the same as the critical price for A sCA ).
We note that since our mechanism implements a monotone algorithm and charges critical prices, Lemma 3.1 implies that undominated strategies for agent i involve choosing a set S i and making a single-minded bid for S i at value t i (S i ). We will therefore assume that agents bid in this way.
Suppose that d is a declaration profile, where each d i is single-minded for S i . For any set T , define
That is, R i is the set of bidders other than 5 And an s approximation for single-minded declarations.
Mechanism M sCA :
. . , T n , charge critical prices. i whose single-minded declared sets intersect T , and Q i is the subset of those bidders whose singleminded declared values are less than agent i's true value for T . We then say that d is separated for
and d is separated if it is separated for every bidder. Since an agent gains positive utility only if the declaration is separated for him, and since the intial state is the empty declaration profile (which is separated), we draw the following conclusion. Lemma 4.3. At each step of the best-response dynamics for mechanism M sCA , the declaration profile submitted by the agents will be separated.
For the remainder of the section we will assume that declaration profiles are separated. Under this assumption, the behaviour of mechanism M sCA simplifies in a fortuitous way.
and hence S i will be allocated by M sCA . On the other hand,
Let A 1 , . . . , A n be an optimal allocation with respect to the agents' true types t.
Proposition 4.5. If d is separated and
We now bound the social welfare obtained by M sCA with respect to the optimal assignment to agents in G. Lemma 4.6.
We are now ready to bound the average social welfare of our mechanism, over sufficiently many rounds, with respect to the approximation factor of algorithm A. 
. , d T is an instance of best-response dynamics with random player order, where agents play undominated strategies, and
with probability at least 1 − ne
Proof. Let G t be the set of agents G from Lemma 4.6 on step t (i.e. with respect to declaration d t ). Lemma 4.2 and Proposition 4.5 together imply that each agent i will be in G t for at least ( 
which implies the required bound.
. . , T n , charge critical prices. Taking, say, ǫ = 0.1, and assuming T >> n,
with high probability. Thus M sCA implements an O(s) approximation to the s-CA problem for bestresponse bidders.
A Mechanism for General CAs
Consider the following algorithm for the general CA problem: try greedily assigning sets, of size at most √ m, by value; return either the resulting solution or the allocation that gives all items to a single agent, whichever has higher welfare. This algorithm is an O( √ m) approximation [23] . We will construct a mechanism M CA based on this algorithm; it is described in Figure 3 . M CA essentially implements two copies of M sCA : one for sets of size at most √ m (which we will call M √ mCA ), and one for allocating all objects to a single bidder; it then takes the maximum of the two solutions. We add one additional modification: with vanishingly small probability γ, M CA ignores bids for M and behaves as M √ mCA . The purpose of this modification is to encourage agents to bid on small sets, even when the presence of a high-valued bid for a large set would seem to indicate that bidding on small sets is fruitless.
The analysis of the average social welfare obtained by M CA closely follows the analysis for M sCA . Our high-level approach is to apply this analysis twice: once for allocations of sets of size at most √ m, and once for allocations of all objects to a single bidder. The primary complicating factor is that the bidding choice of an agent may be influenced by the mechanism's choice of whether or not to allocate M to a single bidder; this can be handled by a careful analysis of utility-maximizing declarations. We defer all details to the appendix. The final result is the following. 
with probability at least 1 − 2ne
We conclude that mechanism M CA implements an O( √ m) approximation to the combinatorial auction problem for best-response bidders, with high probability, whenever T >> n.
Conclusions and Future Work
We considered the problem of designing mechanisms for use with regret-minimizing and bestresponse bidders in repeated combinatorial auctions. We presented a general black-box construction for the regret-minimization model, which implements any monotone loser-independent approximation algorithm. For the best-response model, we constructed an O( √ m)-approximate mechanism for the combinatorial auction problem. The most obvious direction for future research is to extend our results to implement additional algorithms. Our best-response mechanisms made specific use of the structure of greedy CA algorithms, but it seems likely that our approach can be generalized. Another specific question of note is whether Conjecture 4.1 is true, and the mechanism we proposed for regret-minimizing bidders also yields good performance when used by bestresponse bidders. Our techniques appear limited to loser-independent algorithms; can algorithms that are not loser-independent be implemented in regret-minimization or best-response domains? A broader research topic is to explore other models for reasonable bidder behaviour, which may admit different mechanism implementations.
Recall that in our model of best-response dynamics, we assumed that in the initial state every bidder makes the empty declaration ∅, and that if a bidder is chosen for update but cannot improve his utility, he will choose to maintain his previous strategy. We used these assumptions to argue that agents make only separated declarations when participating in mechanisms M sCA and M CA .
These assumptions can be removed, as follows. We can modify mechanisms M sCA and M CA so that, with vanishingly small probability, an alternative allocation rule is used. This alternative rule chooses an agent at random, and assigns him all objects at no cost as long as the input declaration is separated for that agent. Thus, any separated declaration by agent i results in positive expected utility. Then, since any non-separated declaration by an agent results in a utility of 0 for that agent, it must be that the utility-maximizing declaration by any agent must be a separated declaration.
It follows that after each bidder is chosen at least once for update, and every step thereafter, the input declaration will be separated. Thus, with high probability, every declaration after O(n log n) steps will be separated (by the coupon-collector problem). Lemma 4.3 will therefore hold after O(n log n) steps of best-response dynamics, with high probability; the remainder of the analysis can then proceed without change.
Appendix C: Best-response Dynamics on M A might not Converge
Consider a combinatorial auction problem where each agent can receive at most 2 items. Let A be the greedy allocation rule that allocates sets greedily by value. Suppose there are 6 agents and 4 objects, say {a, b, c, d}, and that the agents' true valuations are given by the following set of bids (where the value for a set not listed is taken to be the maximum over its subsets). Since agents 3 and 4 are single-minded, they always maximize their utility by declaring values truthfully, so we can assume in any sequence of best-response moves that they do so. By contrast, players 1 and 2 each have a strategic choice to make each round: which of their two desired sets should they bid upon? Note that once this decision is made, the way to bid is determined by Lemma 3.1 (i.e. bid truthfully for the desired set). We will now show that from each of the resulting 4 possible declaration profiles, some player has incentive to change their declaration.
Suppose that player 1 bids for set {d} and player 2 bids for {b, c}. (Note that under the assumption that all declarations start empty, we can reach such a state by selecting agents for update in the order 3,4,1,2,1). Then player 1 has no incentive to change his declaration, but player 2 would benefit by changing his bid to {a} (increasing his utility from 1 to 2). From that state, player 1 then has incentive to remove his bid for {d} and instead win set {a, b}, also increasing his utility from 1 to 2. If he does so, player 2's utility becomes 0, so player 2 benefits by switching back to his bid for {b, c}. This results in player 1 winning nothing, so player 1 gains by adding back his bid for {d}. We have returned to the original state, and hence no reachable state forms an equilibrium.
Appendix D: Proof of Lemma 4.2
Recall the statement to be proven. We suppose that, for any d, if P 1 (d −i ) is true, then the best response by agent i, d i , satisfies P 2 (d i ). We then wish to show that, for all ǫ > 0, if best-response dynamics is run for T > ǫ −1 n steps, there will be at least (
is true, with probability at least
Proof. For each t, let B t i be the event that neither Suppose that event C r occurs; this implies that B t i occurs, where t is the rth step on which either A t i or B t i occurs. With probability 1 n agent i is chosen for update on step t + 1. Conditioning on that event, A t+1 i occurs (by the assumption of the Lemma), and hence C r+1 does not occur. We conclude P r[C r+1 |C r ] ≤ (1 − 1/n).
Next suppose that event C r does not occur; this implies that A t i occurs, where t is the rth step on which either A t i or B t i occurs. With probability (1 − 1 n ) agent i is not chosen for update on step t + 1. Conditioning on that event, A t+1 i occurs (since P 2 depends only on the declaration of agent i, which does not change), and hence C r+1 does not occur. We conclude P r[C r+1 |¬C r ] ≤ 1/n.
Let D 1 , D 2 , . . . , D T be a random walk on {0, 1} defined by P r[D r |D r−1 ] = (1 − 1/n), P r[D r |¬D r−1 ] = 1/n, and initial condition D 0 . Then r C r is stochastically dominated by r D r , and hence P r[ r C r > (
Solving the recurrence (with initial condition D 0 ) yields
Linearity of expectation then implies
.
From this we conclude that
and moreover
Let k = T /n and define random variables Appendix E: Omitted proofs from Section 4.1
Proof (of Lemma 3.2). Let d
′ be the singleminded declaration for set A i at value t i (A i ). From the definition of regret minimization,
Proof (of Lemma 4.3) . We will prove the following claim, which immediately implies the desired result due to our assumption that the initial state of best-response dynamics is the empty declaration profile (which is separated): for all j such that S i ∩ S j = ∅. Hence, for all j = i, we have Q j (d ′ , S j ) ⊆ Q j (d, S j ). Thus, since d is separated for all j = i, d
′ must be separated for each j = i as well.
Proof (of Proposition 4.5). Note that θ
MsCA i
, so agent i would obtain utility at least 1 2 t i (A i ) by making a single-minded declaration for set A i at value t i (A i ). Thus his utility-maximizing declaration must make at least this much utility, and therefore is a bid for some set S i with t i (S i ) ≥ We note that SW MsCA (d) ≥ 1 2
i∈G2 t i (A i ). Since S j can intersect at most |S j | ≤ s sets A i , we conclude s j d j (S j ) ≥ 1 2 i∈G2 t i (A i ). This implies (4s)SW MsCA (d) ≥ i∈G2 t i (A i ).
We conclude (4s + 4)SW MsCA (d) ≥ i∈G1 d i (S i ) + i∈G2 d i (S i ), which implies the desired result.
